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Introduction  
 
Since the so-called Islamic State (IS) proclaimed its caliphate in mid-2014, people 
from across the world have been attracted by the organisation and keen to join what they 
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Abstract 
Since the declaration of the caliphate in mid-2014, the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) has 
been preoccupying the media as well as experts and scientists. Thereby, the organisation is 
often described as succeeding al Qaida as the most important and most dangerous salafi 
jihadi terror group. Despite the two groups being commonly referred to as salafi jihadi and 
fighting for supremacy in the jihadi landscape, they differ in terms of ideology and creed 
(ʿaḳīda), as well as their way of fighting a jihad (manhadj). The purpose of my paper is to 
highlight the differing ideologies of the two organisations regarding their excommunication 
of (Sunni) Muslims (takfīr) by analysing jihadi sources. The Islamic State uses the concept 
of excommunication (takfīr) to legitimise violence against four categories of Sunnis: (1) 
Muslim rulers, who do not rule according to the sharia; (2) Islamist parties that take part in 
democratic elections; (3) Muslim rebels questioning the authority of a ruler; and (4) other 
jihadis who come to the defence of Sunnis who are declared apostates by IS. Whereas al 
Qaida agrees in the excommunication of the first two categories, it heavily criticises IS for 
excluding the third and fourth categories of people from the Islamic society (umma), 
accuses IS of leaning towards extremism (ghulū) and provoking a division of the society 
(fitna). Analysing IS’s extensive use of excommunication of Sunni opponents and al 
Qaida’s criticism of it, I derive the conclusion that the two organisations differ in their 
definition of who belongs to the Muslim society (umma) and thus is to be protected. This 
means that IS does not succeed al Qaida but takes an even more extremist orientation. 
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perceive as a true Islamic State. Not only have a large proportion of local Sunni populations in 
Iraq and Syria joined the organisation; moreover, according to estimates of the International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), over 20,000 foreign 
fighters – approximately 4,000 of them Westerners – have made their way to IS-controlled 
territory since the proclamation of the caliphate (Neumann, 2015). Trying to stop their 
nationals from leaving for Iraq and Syria, Western governments are now starting to 
implement various prevention programs. By including former IS members in such programs, 
governments and non-governmental organisations aim to reveal the brutality and extreme 
methods used by IS against their opponents, including people from the Sunni creed 
(International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 2017). 
Surprisingly, it is not only Western organisations that criticise the cruelty and violence 
of IS. Furthermore, another organisation is trying to stop Sunnis from joining IS by accusing 
it of being an extremist organisation, namely al Qaida. The once-leading jihadist organisation 
cut ties with its former affiliate in February 2014, accusing it of a wrong creed (ʿaḳīda) and 
way of dealing with opponents (manhadj) (Tanẓīm ḳāʿida al-djihād., 2014). 
By outlining the discourse about the concept of takfīr between IS and al Qaida, the 
purpose of this paper is to highlight the different ideologies of the organisations and 
eventually demonstrate that the two organisations have differing concepts of what constitutes 
the Islamic umma. While most studies focus on the structural differences between al Qaida 
and IS, this paper aims to shed light on the theological differences between the organisations. 
By taking into account not only takfīr of the ruling elites but also takfīr between IS and al 
Qaida, I want to produce a more complete understanding of the ideological differences 
between the organisations, the people they claim to represent and thus their respective target 
groups. After providing a background to the evolution of IS from a local al Qaida affiliate to 
its split with the organisation, the concept of takfīr is briefly explained. The paper then traces 
the use of takfīr by IS to justify its violence against objectors as well as al Qaida’s criticism of 
IS’s extensive use of the concept. Finally, the two different approaches are compared to gain a 
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deeper understanding of the two organisations’ inclusion (respectively exclusion) of people 
from – and thus their definition of – the umma. 
 
Methodology 
 
Based on a social constructivist approach and the assumption that reality is constructed 
through discourses and social interactions, this paper concentrates on the process of the jihadi 
construction of reality by conducting a critical discourse analysis (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 
25). Units of analysis are speeches and statements of the leadership of al Qaida and the 
Islamic State (as well as its precursors) from the foundation of al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) in 
October 2004 until the fall of the former IS strongholds Mosul and Raqqa in 2017. The 
speeches are analysed regarding the ideology (ʿaḳīda) and practice (manhadj) of takfīr and the 
way in which the discourse about takfīr is used by the organisations in their attempt to 
(re)gain the power of interpretation of jihadi concepts and thus supremacy of the movement. 
Overall, over 120 speeches were examined.2 
 
From Tawḥīd wa-l-Djihād to the Islamic State  
 
Abu Musab al Zarqawi – founder of IS’s predecessor Tawḥīd wa-l-Djihād – left his 
home country Jordan in the 1980s to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, like many others 
at this time. Despite receiving 200,000 US Dollars from al Qaida for a training camp near 
Herat, Zarqawi was only loosely affiliated with the organisation and did not give an oath of 
fealty (bay‘a) to al Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden (Bunzel, 2015, p. 13). After the US 
invasion in Afghanistan, Zarqawi fled to Iraq, where he – within the context of the Iraqi 
insurgency – further developed his organisation and ideology. At that time, the group targeted 
three types of enemies: the Jordanian and other nominal Muslim regimes that it considers un-
                                                 
2 Where applicable, in this paper English translations of the speeches – which are mostly distributed as audio 
files – are quoted. The translations are provided by official jihadi media departments or supporters of the groups. 
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Islamic; the international community dominated by the West, which in Zarqawi’s view is 
oppressing Islam; as well as members of the Shi’i confession of Islam, whom Zarqawi regards 
as polytheists (Lister, 2014, p. 7). These targets considerably differ from those of al Qaida. 
Even though Bin Laden criticises Muslim rulers and Shiites, he wants his organisation to 
focus on the so-called far enemy, namely the US. 
Despite ideological differences, Zarqawi finally pledged allegiance to Bin Laden in 
September 2004 (Tawḥīd wa-l-djihād, 2004). With Bin Laden accepting Zarqawi’s bayʿa, his 
group subsequently became an official al Qaida affiliate, known as al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). By 
becoming an official affiliate, Zarqawi gains access to financial resources and al Qaida’s 
recruiting structures and training cooperation (Nelson, Sanderson, Bagia, Bodurian & Gordon, 
2011, p. 10). “The al-Qaeda leader’s hesitations about his field commander’s arrogance and 
sectarianism were sacrificed to the morale-building blows the latter was delivering to the 
world’s greatest far enemy” (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 35). In addition, al Qaida is able to 
take roots in one of the most central Muslim countries. Terrorism researcher Zelin (2014, p. 2) 
thus accurately describes the merger as a “marriage of convenience”. 
Following the US invasion in Iraq, Zarqawi’s tendencies to exploit the political 
situation and target the Shi’i majority have grown stronger. With the occupation, the existing 
constitution of the country is suspended and a new constitution is implemented, which has 
“emphasised differences and divisive issues rather than focusing on the uniting elements of 
Iraqi society” (Jawad, 2013, p. 5). The implementation of a democratic election system also 
leads to an expansion of power of the Shi’i population, which makes up 60% of the Iraqi 
population, whereas power is restrained for the 20% Iraqi Sunnis who had excessive political 
power under the Saddam regime. In addition to the loss of political weight, several thousand 
Sunni men were suddenly without work and perspective when the US civil administration 
dissolved the Iraqi army and the Baath party (Steinberg, 2015, p. 43). 
Zarqawi is able to exploit this discontent of the Sunni population and blames the Iraqi 
government for favouring Shi’is over Sunnis. According to him, the Shia would be more 
dangerous than the US and have to be fought first (Zarqawi, u.d.), an approach that clearly 
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contradicts Bin Laden’s focus on the US as a prior enemy. By contrast, Zarqawi wants to lead 
Shi’is into a civil war until they submit to Sunnis (Wichmann, 2014, p. 272). 
This strategy is heavily criticised by al Qaida, whose leadership reminds Zarqawi of 
the importance that the broader Sunni population approves of the mujahidin’s strategy. The 
movement should “avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve […] as long 
as there are other options to resort to” (Zawahiri, 2005). Despite claiming that Shiism was a 
“religious school based on excess and falsehood”, Zawahiri (2005) – at the time Bin Laden’s 
deputy and the current leader of al Qaida – excuses the Shi’i’s wrong creed (ʿaḳīda) with 
them not knowing better. The organisation’s leaders advise Zarqawi to strengthen the 
reputation of his movement by avoiding alienating the broader Sunni population in Iraq. 
In 2006, Zarqawi indeed tried to strengthen its reputation, albeit not by ending 
violence against Shi’i targets, but rather by trying to make AQI more Iraqi after the 
organisation faced criticism for comprising too many foreigners. In January 2006, AQI – 
together with five other jihadi groups – formed the madjlis shūrā al-mudjāhidīn to improve 
the coordination against the unbelievers (Madjlis shūrā al-mudjāhidīn, 2006). Despite the 
leadership of the council going to the Iraqi Abu Omer al Baghdadi, AQI still has central 
control over the operations of the council (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 49). After Zarqawi’s 
death, his successor Abu Hamza al Masri – who did not pledge alliance to Bin Laden – 
declared the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in Sunni territories in October 2006 
(Steinberg, 2015, p. 59). It is worth noticing that ISI did not control any territory at this time. 
“Like the MSC [Madjlis shūrā Council] the ISI was designed to put an Iraqi face to al-
Qaida’s efforts in the insurgency” (Fishman & Felter, 2007, p. 5). In the following years, the 
declaration of a state did not have any real consequences. A main reason for this is the 
formation of the ṣaḥwa movement, which includes many influential Sunni tribal leaders who 
join the US in fighting jihadis in Iraq. Consequently, ISI – which counted as many as 10,000 
fighters in 2006 – shrunk to a group of approximately 1,000-2,000 in 2010 (Steinberg, 2015, 
p. 69). 
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Following the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2009, ISI could regain some of its strengths 
and was able to build administrative structures in some Iraqi provinces and free several 
hundred former jihadis from Iraqi prisons (al Furqan Media, 2012). In 2010, after Abu Omer 
al Baghdadi was killed by an US airstrike, he was succeeded by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the 
current caliph of IS. He is not only claimed to have a religious education and be from the tribe 
of the Quraysh (a prerequisite for being a caliph), but has also spent some time in Camp 
Bucca, a US prison that is currently seen as a ‘school of terror’. Stern and Berger (2015, p. 
38) assume that at least eight members of the ISI leadership were prisoners of Camp Bucca. 
At the end of 2011, the organisation was so strong that Baghdadi sent one of the regional ISI 
leaders – Syrian national Abu Muhammad al Jaulani – to Syria to build a jihadi network there. 
After the outbreak of the revolution in 2011, the country fell into civil war and functioned as a 
gateway for fighters on their way to Iraq (Lister, 2014). Additionally, following a general 
amnesty in May 2011, many experienced jihadis were freed from Syrian prisons (Weiss & 
Hassan, 2015) and joined Jaulani’s group Nusra Front (djabhat an nuṣra). The group was 
soon able to gain the support of the local population and initially positioned itself as an 
independent organisation from ISI and al Qaida (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 41). In contrast to 
ISI – which initiated the foundation of the Nusra Front – targets of the organisation are mainly 
forces of the Syrian regime, not members of the Shi’i population. With this strategy, Jaulani 
follows Zawahiri’s guidelines for Jihad, in which he only legitimises violence against Shi’is 
in the case that they attacked the mujahedeen first (Zawahiri, 2013a). 
Presumably due to Nusra’s good reputation in Syria, in April 2013 Baghdadi (2013b) 
declared the merger of his organisation with Nusra and thus ISI’s expansion to Syria. He 
renamed the organisation as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham). Just one day later, Jaulani 
declared his organisation to be independent of ISIS and pledged allegiance to Zawahiri 
(Bunzel, 2015, p. 25). As a result, fighting between members of the two organisations 
unfolded in Syria. This prompted the al Qaida leadership to intervene and request the 
dissolution of ISIS (Zawahiri, 2013b). Baghdadi (2013b) refused to limit his area of operation 
to Iraq and declared the further existence of ISIS. Finally, the discrepancies between the 
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organisations and ISIS’s rejection of submission under Zawahiri’s rule prompted the latter to 
cut ties with its former affiliate and declare that al Qaida is not responsible for ISIS’s actions 
(Tanẓīm ḳāʿida al-djīhād, 2014). Just a few month later, ISIS renamed itself as IS and 
proclaimed the caliphate. The global jihad movement became divided and the two 
organisations fought for supremacy of the jihadi movement. 
 
The Use of Takfīr by the Islamic State 
 
Whereas IS welcomes Sunnis of all different nationalities to their organisation, it takes 
extreme action against anyone who is unwilling to subordinate to its rule. It not only 
persecutes Western forces in the area, members of the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, Christians 
and other minorities in the region; moreover, it also uses violence against Sunnis who object 
their caliphate. In order to justify their violent approach towards Sunnis, IS uses takfīr, an 
Islamic concept that denotes the act of excommunication of a nominal Muslim. 
 
Definition of takfīr 
Takfīr is a legal concept in Islam to exclude someone from the community of 
believers, the Islamic umma. Thereby, an action, a person or a whole group of people can be 
declared unbelievers (Hunwick, 1999; Lewis, 2002, p. 142ff.). In jihadi discourse, takfīr is 
mainly used for actions that are seen as major unbelief (kufr akbār), polytheism (shirk) or 
apostasy (ridda). Under some circumstances, the consequence of takfīr is not only punishment 
in the afterlife (ākhira), but can also mean that a person can be legitimately killed and their 
property can be confiscated in this life (dunyā). Due to the severe consequences of declaring 
someone as an unbeliever (kāfir), takfīr of a specific individual can only be pronounced by 
religious scholars. As Hegghammer (2009) highlights, there has never been a consensus of the 
circumstances under which someone can be declared an unbeliever. In addition, not only the 
circumstances or prerequisites for takfīr are debated, but also the consequences of declaring 
someone an unbeliever. Depending on the circumstances and the priorities of jihad, scholars 
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do not always suggest the death penalty as the appropriate consequence of takfīr. This 
obscurity is reflected in the current debate of jihadists. 
Reflecting on former scholarly work and referring to the salaf aṣ-ṣāliḥ – the first three 
generations after the prophet Muhammad3 – IS uses takfīr against four groups of people: 
Muslim rulers, who do not rule according to the sharia; Islamist parties that take part in 
democratic elections; Muslim rebels questioning the authority of a ruler; and other jihadis 
coming to the defence of Sunnis who are declared apostates by IS. 
 
Takfīr against Muslim rulers 
The first group of people who are declared unbelievers by IS are Muslim 
(Sunni) rulers who do not rule according to the sharia. Islam is seen by the 
organisation as an all-encompassing system (niẓām) that does not differentiate 
between political and private spheres. Islam as a system regulates not only the 
private life, but also politics and society as a whole, as a system of life (niẓām al-
hayāt) (Hartung, 2013, p. 101). In order to declare today’s rulers of the Muslim 
world unbelievers, like other Islamist organisations before it IS refers – inter alia – 
to the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. According to him, rebellion or jihad against 
a Muslim ruler or imam can only be justified in Islamic law if the ruler violates the 
fundamental obligations of a Muslim. In order to support a rebellion against the 
rulers of his time, Mongols who converted to Islam, Ibn Taymiyyah declared ruling 
with law based on the sharia as fundamental part of being a Muslim. Because the 
Mongols introduced their own legal system that was not based on the sharia, Ibn 
Taymiyyah stated that they were acting in breach of the fundamental principles of a 
Muslim and thus could be declared unbelievers (kuffār) by him (Baehr, 2009, p. 22). 
It is the same approach that al Qaida and other local jihadist groups use to 
excommunicate the rulers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries and 
                                                 
3 For an in-depth discussion of the definition “generation” and the period covered by the first three generations, 
see Nezda (2014, p. 96 et sqq). 
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that also IS uses to excommunicate these rulers. For IS, only a state governed 
completely and without any exceptions by the sharia is an Islamic one, as IS 
spokesperson Adnani (2014a) states: 
If the people were to commit to all of the rulings of Islam except for example 
committing to the command forbidding Riba (usury), and they allowed Riba-based 
banks, then the constitution of such a state is to be considered as a constitution of 
disbelief, for this action implies that they believe the Shari'ah to be incomplete in 
perfection and that they lack belief in the perfection of the One that revealed it, 
Glorious and Exalted is He. It is not a secret that this is kufr akbar (major disbelief) 
which causes one to be expelled from the Religion.  
 
A special role is assigned to the armies of the Muslim countries by IS since they – 
according to the organisation – protect the ruling elite, which could not govern their 
countries without the protection of the army. Thereby, the army is declared to fall 
into the category of kufr and is expulsed from the religion. According to IS, the 
consequence is that the armies of Muslim countries have to be fought (Adnani, 
2013). In declaring Sunni rulers as well as the whole institution of Muslim armies’ 
unbelievers, IS is making collective takfīr with members of the respective 
institutions and does not distinguish between different individuals and their reasons 
for joining a state institution. All members have to be fought and can legitimately be 
killed. 
Although IS uses takfīr to exclude Muslim rulers from the umma and regularly names 
them taghūt – an Islamic term that refers in the Islamic context to the adversaries of 
Muhammad and includes the notion of polytheism – takfīr of Muslim rulers does not take up 
much space in IS discourse about takfīr. An explanation for the relatively small role that takfīr 
of Muslim rulers plays in IS propaganda is that IS’s main territory is based in Iraq and Syria. 
This means that the organisation’s primary enemies are not formal Sunni rulers, but rather 
Alawites in Syria and elected politicians in Iraq. 
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Takfīr against democrats and Islamic parties 
The second Sunni group that IS uses takfīr to legitimise violence against it are 
democrats, Islamic and even Islamist parties. The Syrian regime and elite belong to the 
Alawite creed. In IS’s view, they cannot be excommunicated since they were never part of the 
Muslim umma. Therefore, the organisation mainly uses takfīr to defame the regime and Sunni 
parties that participate in elections in Iraq. 
In salafi ideology, democratic elections contradict Islamic principles. In his book 
‘Democracy is a Religion’ (ad-dīmuḳrāṭīya dīn) widely distributed in jihadi circles, Abu 
Muhammad al Maqdisi – Zarqawi’s former mentor – declares democracy to be a religion that 
is worshipped by its supporters. According to Maqdisi, this contradicts the Islamic concept of 
tawḥīd, the oneness of God (Maqdisi, 1997). Men-made laws stand beside the law of Allah or 
even above it, which puts it in the field of polytheism (shirk). Therefore, democracy can be 
seen as a modern form of kufr. 
IS uses the same explanation to declare the democratically-elected government of Iraq 
as an unbelieving one: 
These deputies and the legislators are idols erected under a dome that submit to an  
unjust and wrongful law or constitution, which contradicts the Islamic Shari'a and  
many of the fundamentals of our true religion, and to which they refer in case of  
disagreements and when enacting and explicating any article or law. It is a religion  
that contradicts the religion of Allah, which called us to turn matters of  
disagreements to Allah (Baghdadi, 2010). 
 
Abu Hamza al Muhajir – the former spokesperson of ISI, who was killed together with Abu 
Omer al Baghdadi in 2010 by an US airstrike – emphasises the role of the Ministry of Justice 
in promoting secular men-made law. According to him, the Ministry is especially responsible 
for the fact that people are governed by men-made law rather than the sharia. In this context, 
he also criticises the courts that apply these laws (Muhajir, 2009). Law made in parliaments 
by people – and thus democracy – falls under the category of polytheism (shirk). For IS, there 
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is no excuse for polytheism. Not knowing that something is shirk or ignorance (djahl) – which 
for al Qaida is an appropriate excuse not to pursue Shi’is or people who participate in 
democratic elections – is no excuse for the worship of idols for IS (“Irjā´. The Most 
Dangerous Bid´ah”, 2015). 
In the organisation’s view, it does not matter whether the parties participating in 
elections are secular or Islamist. The mere fact that a party agrees to make law by having a 
seat in parliament is seen as a sign of unbelief. Therefore, Islamic and even Islamist parties 
and their members are also declared unbelievers. Whereas some speeches of the 
organisation’s leaders deal with the Iraqi party system (especially before the elections in 
2010), a greater proportion of IS takfīr against Islamic parties deals with the unbelief of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. IS not only accuses the Brotherhood of shirk due to their participation 
in elections, but also criticises it for cooperating with the West in fighting the mujahidin 
(Adnani, 2013, 2014a; Baghdadi, 2016; Muhajir, 2007). In Iraq, Islamic parties are 
particularly criticised by IS, since – according to the organisation – through participating in 
the political process and elections the Islamic parties help the West and the Shi’i majority in 
parliament to oppress the Sunni minority (Baghdadi, 2007). Whereas Abu Omer al Baghdadi 
(2007) declared members of all parties participating in parliament – including the Islamic 
ones – unbelievers, he explicitly stated that this ruling (ḥukm) does not apply for voters of the 
respective parties as long as the legitimate confutation has not been clarified to them. Seven 
years later, the organisation became clearly more extreme in this context when IS spokesmen 
Adnani (2014a) not only declared members of parties and the government ministries 
unbelievers, but also made takfīr on voters for their participation in elections and accused 
them of apostasy. 
 
Takfīr against bughāt and munāfiḳīn 
However, even if Sunnis do not participate in elections, they are still not safe from 
being accused of unbelief by IS. Taking the prophet as an example, the organisation states that 
Muhammad was sent by Allah with four swords: one for polytheists (mushrikīn); one for the 
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people of the book (ahl al kitāb), which means Christians and Jews; one for the hypocrites 
(munāfiḳīn); and one for Muslims who rebel against their ruler (bughāt) (“Islam is the 
Religion of the Sword not Pacifism”, 2015). The last two categories allow IS to justify 
violence against a broad range of people, mainly Sunnis or Sunni tribes who stand in the 
organisation’s way. In IS’s view, just those are believed to be Muslims who direct their whole 
life towards Allah. A confession of faith (shahāda), fasting (ṣiyām) and praying (ṣalāh) alone 
would not constitute a Muslim life (al-Hayat Media Center, 2014, p. 31). Whereas in 
mainstream Sunni discourse rebellion does not constitute unbelief, bughāt are allowed to 
repent and the hadd sentences are not applied (Kraemer, 1980, p. 48ff.), IS allows its 
followers to use violence against them. An example is the tribes in the area of Diyala that 
were part of the ṣaḥwa movement fighting IS predecessor ISI. Abu Omer al Baghdadi (2008) 
claims that those tribes would reject Islam and thus legitimises their blood to be spilled: 
As for the lives of Ahlu al-Sunnah in Diyala and elsewhere, their blood  
has no worth. This Front continues to protect and fight side by side with the  
invaders, and it is truly more Rafida4 and Magus than al-Rafida themselves. 
 
The organisation clearly sees every rebellion against or confrontation of their organisation or 
ideology as an act of unbelief. It is allowed to fight people who oppose the organisation or its 
caliphate: 
The Islamic State - on account of what Allah has blessed it with of victory, 
consolidation and establishing the religion - is regarded as an unquestionable imamah. 
As such, anyone who rebels against its authority inside its territory is considered a 
renegade, and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah against him 
(i.e. clarifying his error to him with proof) (“The Islamic State is a True Imamah”, 
2014, p. 27). 
                                                 
4 Rāfiḍa means rejecters and is a polemic term used to defy Shi’i groups like the Imamates. For more 
information about this term, see Kohlberg (1995). 
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Thereby, the enemy images of IS are classified in the pattern of a bipolar world. There is the 
absolute truth embodied by IS, and complete falsehood, embodied by everyone else (Kinani, 
2014). Individuals or groups who disagree with the organisation’s ‘absolute truth’ are 
declared unbelievers (kuffār), which justifies the use of violence against them. As Milton 
(2014) accurately summarised, IS permits the use of force against broad categories of 
individuals. 
 
Takfīr against jihadis 
Surprisingly, takfīr is not only made against local populations and Muslims, but also 
members of other jihadi organisations, like al Qaida or competing jihadi groups in Syria are 
declared unbelievers when they criticise IS’s actions. Thereby, IS claims to follow the path of 
al Qaida founder Bin Laden and accuses the organisation of going astray from the right path, 
which causes a division (fitna) between the mujahidin. Addressing al Qaida leader Zawahiri, 
IS spokesman Adnani (2014a) accuses him of causing a fitna because he does not submit to 
IS: 
[…] the fitnah that you were the cause of. Yes, you are the cause of. Yes, you are  
the cause of it, for you made of yourself and your Qa'idah a laughing stock and a game 
played in the hand of a young boy, a treacherous evil-doer disloyal to the pledge of 
allegiance that you did not see, and you left him to play with you like a child playing 
with a ball. Your prestige has gone and you have lost your history and your glory, so 
hasten and beware of a bad ending. 
 
IS not only verbally attacks al Qaida leaders directly; moreover, it also makes takfīr on other 
jihadi scholars who take sides for Zawahiri, like Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi (2014a, 2014b) 
or Abu Qatada al-Filistini (2014a, 2014b), both of whom criticise IS’s ʿaḳīda and support al 
Qaida in their fight for supremacy.   
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Al Qaida’s Criticism of IS’s Takfīr 
 
Whereas IS is using takfīr against a broad range of Sunni opponents, al Qaida heavily 
criticises the organisation for doing so. The organisation’s criticism is twofold: al Qaida itself 
sets priority to fighting the so-called far enemy, the US. The aim is to weaken the US first, so 
that Muslim governments can be overthrown in a second step. Therefore, it criticises IS for 
not setting priorities, but rather fighting on multiple fronts at the same time. It is a criticism 
that does not aim at IS ideology, but rather their method (manhadj). In addition, al Qaida also 
accuses IS of leaning towards extremism and thus having a false creed (ʿaḳīda). In this 
chapter, al Qaida’s criticism of IS’s manhadj and ʿaḳīda regarding takfīr shall be analysed to 
show the differences between the two organisations and eventually in their definition of the 
umma. 
 
Criticism of IS’s manhadj 
Whereas al Qaida agrees on the takfīr of Muslim rulers who do not rule according to 
the sharia, as well as democratic parties, it criticises the way in which IS deals with these 
enemies (manhadj). 
When Bin Laden declared his war against the US in 1996, he determined a strategy 
that his organisation adheres to until today: the prioritisation of the far enemy over the near 
enemy. The idea behind this prioritisation is that should the US withdraw from the Arab 
world and stop supporting the pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world, the organisation 
would be able to overthrow these regimes more easily (Steinberg, 2005). To date, this 
prioritisation of the far enemy has not changed. Zawahiri (2013a) still adheres to the strategy 
of targeting the US first to overthrow Muslim regimes: 
The purpose of targeting America is to exhaust her and bleed her to death, so  
that it meets the fate of the former Soviet Union and collapses under its own weight  
as a result of its military, human, and financial losses. Consequently, its grip on our  
lands will weaken and its allies will begin to fall one after another. 
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This strategy of targeting the US first does not alter the idea of Arab regimes and rulers being 
unbelievers. Al Qaida still makes takfīr on those regimes. The first reason for them making 
takfīr is – like for IS – the implementation of law that does not comply with the sharia by 
Arab regimes. Additionally, the organisation accuses the rulers of putting themselves and 
their laws in a position next to God: 
This is the important reality that the rulers manipulate, even if they use Islam as a 
cover, particularly in some countries, where they assigned an army of ulema, 
preachers, writers, and the entire mass media for about a century to exaggerate the 
meaning of obedience to the ruler, deviating from the restrictions to this concept as 
stipulated in God's religion. Therefore, the ruler became an idol to be worshipped 
instead of God […] (Bin Laden, 2004, p. 227) 
 
The second reason for declaring the Arab regimes unbelievers is their support of and 
submission to the US. An example often used by Bin Laden and still used by Zawahiri today 
is that Arab countries allowed the US to open military bases in their land, from which the US 
attacked other Muslim countries like Afghanistan or Syria. “This is obvious support for the 
infidels […] and a cardinal sin that renders one an infidel” (Bin Laden, 2004, p. 223). 
The Islamic concept behind these accusations is that of loyalty and disavowal (walāʿ 
wa-l barāʿ), which regulates social interactions with fellow Muslims as well as non-Muslims. 
There should be loyalty and love for the sake of Allah for every Muslim, whereas non-
Muslims should be disavowed from. Al Qaida sees a clear breach of this concept when 
Muslim rulers collaborate with the US or take them as allies. However, unlike IS – which 
calls on its supporters to fight the near enemy and everyone working for them – al Qaida does 
not derive any current consequences from making takfīr on the Muslim regimes. 
Consequences are delayed until the US would be sufficiently weak that it could no longer 
support local regimes. The consequence of takfīr – fighting the regimes and using violence 
against them – will come later: 
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Once the American enemy has been defeated, our next step would be targeting the 
region’s leaders who had been the pillars of support for that American hegemony. […] 
Once those leaders have been defeated, God willing our next step will be building our 
Muslim state. (Bin Laden, n.d.) 
 
The same logic applies for Muslim parties participating in elections. The organisation uses the 
same arguments for making takfīr on elected parliaments as IS does: 
It being “democratic” means that sovereignty is derived from the wishes of the 
majority, without regards to any standard, morality or creed. A democratic government 
must be secular, or in other words atheist, because governance and authority is not the 
sole right of Allah Most High, but rather subject to the desire of the majority 
(Zawahiri, 2011). 
 
However, even though al Qaida agrees with IS on the unbelief of democratic elections 
because they replace God’s law with men-made law, the former’s use of takfīr does not 
constitute the consequence of using violence against those parties. Again, the reason is that 
the far enemy – who (to some degree) supports parliamentary elections in the region – has to 
be weakened first for jihadists to overthrow the regimes. 
Although IS makes takfīr on Islamic regimes and parties and also derives lethal 
consequences from their takfīr and thus are fighting on multiple fronts, there remains a 
prioritisation of enemies taking place. Before fighting Sunni apostates, IS spokesperson 
Adnani (2014b) calls on the organisation’s supporters in the Arab countries to fight the Shia 
first: 
The mujahidin realized the Rafidah are a more dangerous enemy that threaten Islam 
and Muslims, and a pickaxe that destroys the pillars of Islam, and that the Islamic 
State took upon itself the fighting of the Rafidah everywhere. 
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Therefore, the manhadj of the two organisations not only differ in their consequences of 
takfīr, but also in their prioritisation of who should be fought first. 
 
Criticism of IS’s ʿaḳīda 
In addition to criticism of IS’s methods, al Qaida also accuses IS of having a wrong 
understanding of Islam. The organisation’s leader Zawahiri (n.d.) criticises IS for using takfīr 
as they please: 
[…] their Takfeer is political and an opportunistic one that seeks benefits. And the one 
who agrees with them or in whom they find benefit in being affiliated with, they praise 
him, rather they repeatedly ask him to mention them and praise them, in order to gain 
status amongst the people by means of that. And the one who opposes them, they lie 
about him and slander him and make Takfeer on him, following the path of Takfeer 
for (justifying) explosion, elimination and tyranny. 
 
For al Qaida, using takfīr mainly to support one’s own group and undermine others who stand 
in their way means that IS is leaning towards extremism. This leads to the unlawful spilling of 
Muslim blood and eventually to a division of the mujahedin and the Muslims. 
 
The reproach of extremism and exaggeration (ghulū) 
When it comes to takfīr, al Qaida accuses IS of being too extreme. The organisation 
would make takfīr on anyone who is unwilling to submit to the organisation and live 
according to their rules. This is even the case for people whom al Qaida would not see as 
unbelievers, but as fellow Muslims who can be excused for committing minor sins. 
However they [IS] make Takfeer on the people by fabricating and by lying and for 
actions which are not Kufr, rather even for acts of obedience and for adherence to the 
Book and to the Sunnah (Zawahiri, n.d.). 
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Regarding IS’s excessive use of takfīr, al Qaida often compares them to the early Khawarij. 
This group emerged after the death of the prophet Muhammad and is famous for their 
extremism in takfīr of people who commit even minor sins. In an attempt to defame IS, al 
Qaida accuses the organisation of being even worse than the Khawarij (Zawahiri, 2016a; 
Zawahiri, n.d.). One main reason that al Qaida’s current leader Zawahiri (n.d.) gives for 
blaming IS of being more extremist than the early Khawarij is that the Khawarij made takfīr 
on sinners, but that IS would even make up sins when they want to legitimise the killing of 
someone: 
These people [i.e. the Khawarij] used to claim that they were upon the methodology of 
Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah and that they do not make Takfeer for sins, just like the 
claims of Baghdadi's group who are claiming that they are upon the methodology of 
Ahlus Sunnah. However they make Takfeer on the people by fabricating and by lying 
and for actions which are not Kufr, rather even for acts of obedience and for adherence 
to the Book and to the Sunnah. 
 
This means that IS makes takfīr on people who – for al Qaida – belong to the Muslim umma 
and adhere to Islam. Al Qaida accuses IS supporters of making up sins that lead to takfīr to 
fight Sunnis who are not on their side. For al Qaida, people who commit sins are not 
necessarily to be excluded from the community of believers. Therefore, the consequence of 
IS’s takfīr of a broad range of its opponents through the lens of al Qaida is an unlawful 
spilling of Muslim blood.   
 
The reproach of the unlawful spilling of Muslim blood  
The concept of tatarrus – the lawful spilling of Muslim blood – in mainstream Muslim 
discourse is a discussion about when Muslims are allowed to be killed, when the enemy uses 
them as a human shield (Landau-Tasseron, 2006).5 In jihadi discourse, the definition of 
tatarrus deviates from the mainstream discourse. Nearly every killing of a Muslim – whether 
                                                 
5 Some Muslim scholars also use the concept for non-Muslim non-combatants. 
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because someone (falsely) made takfīr on a Muslim or when Muslims are killed in an attack 
on the enemy – falls into the category of tatarrus and jihadi groups are quick to discuss the 
lawfulness of the spilling of Muslim blood. In recent years, owing to IS’s excessive use of 
takfīr the discourse has changed into one about who is a rightful Muslim and thus whose 
blood is not allowed to be spilled. 
Al Qaida accuses IS of unlawfully spilling Muslim blood. As already mentioned, the 
point of departure for the criticism is IS’s excessive use of takfīr, which results in the killing 
of people who al Qaida consider as Muslims. Therefore, when the fight between the Nuṣra 
Front and ISIS in Syria escalated in 2013, Zawahiri issued al Qaida’s guidelines for Jihad. In 
them, he explicitly stated that the two groups should “refrain from harming Muslims by 
explosions, killing, kidnapping or destroying their wealth or property.” Moreover, one should 
“refrain from targeting enemies in mosques, markets and gatherings, where they mix with 
Muslims or with those who do not fight us.” Whereas the second guideline falls into the 
classical category of tatarrus, namely the killing of Muslims as causalities when targeting an 
enemy, the first one includes the direct targeting of people who – according to Zawahiri – 
belong to the umma. 
In addition to criticising the spilling of ordinary Muslim’s blood, Zawahiri (2016b) 
also heavily criticises the killing of members of rival mujahidin groups: 
And then, he [Baghdadi, the leader of IS] sends his assassin groups to explode the 
heads of the monotheist Mujahideen [sic!] and the best of them, those who are striving 
to rule by the Sharia and striving to establish the Khilafa that is upon the Prophetic 
methodology, while many of them have been on the battlefields of Jihad even before 
them for decades, and they have neither changed nor compromised. 
 
The fight for supremacy and over the spilling of blood goes so far that even jihadis who are 
not aligned to either of the two organisations interfere in the fight between al Qaida and IS. 
Thereby, almost all important and independent jihadis – like al Maqdisi or Abu Qatada – 
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support al Qaida in criticising IS extremism and its spilling of Muslim, and even mujahidin 
blood: 
And what the group the “State” has done is shifting away the current rivalry between it 
and its opponent over the leadership of the Jihad groups – i.e the Al Qaida’s group –  
towards explicit blood and to give this spilling of impermissible blood a legal  
characteristic where we will find the fiqh of Bughaat (rebels) as has been announced 
by the deeply ignorant Adnani in this statement of his, where he warned those who 
break the bondage of obedience, that its verdict is blood and killing (Filistini, 2014a). 
 
Maqdisi (2014c) clearly distances himself from the organisation, whose predecessor was 
founded by his former student Zarqawi, and accuses them of a wrong creed and exaggeration: 
[…] I announce, here, that Tandheem al-Dawlah fil-‘Iraq wal-Shaam, is a deviant  
organisation from the path of truth, [they are] aggressors against the Mujahideen. They 
lean towards ghuluw. They have become embroiled in the spilling of unlawful blood, 
the sequestration of their wealth, war booty, and [the] regions which they have 
liberated from the [Asaad] regime, [This group] has besmirched the name of Jihad and 
the elite Mujahideen.6 
 
As one can see from the interference of jihadis who are not members of either of the two 
organisations, the fight for supremacy of the jihadi landscape not only takes place between the 
two organisations, but also in the wider jihadi scene. Jihadis worldwide take sides in the fight 
and the jihadis worldwide are divided over which organisation they support. 
 
The reproach of splitting the Muslim community (fitna) 
The division (fitna) of the jihadis is something that the two organisations accuse each 
other of being the cause of. With IS’s proclamation of the caliphate and their call for other 
                                                 
6 Insertions are from the original document. 
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jihadi and Islamist organisations to submit to the caliphate and swear an oath of allegiance 
(bayʿa) to its leader Baghdadi, Zawahiri (2016b) states that they would divide the Muslims: 
[…] calling people towards the khilafa of detonations and explosions and blowing up 
things will lead to igniting strife amongst the Mujahidin, between those who follow 
the khalifa of explosions and detonations and blowups, who consider the rest of the 
Mujahidin to have no legitimacy, saying that they are Bughaat (transgressors, rebels) 
and sometimes even apostates, and between those who do not accept his domination, 
who strive to establish the Khilafa upon the Prophetic methodology. And we have seen 
its disaster in the fighting amongst the Mujahidin in Shaam, which is threatening to 
destroy the Jihad, while the first and foremost benefactor would be the enemies of 
Islam. 
 
For al Qaida, the cause of the fitna is not only IS’s proclamation of the caliphate, but also 
them making takfīr on a broad range of individuals and the leaders of al Qaida themselves 
(Zawahiri 2016a, 2016b, n.d.). 
Thus, these poor souls are causing devastation for the Jihadi movement, and causing 
chaos inside it, with the movement being destroyed by the very hands of those who 
claim to belong to it, while the enemies of Islam watch this disaster and rejoice 
(Zawahiri 2016b). 
 
As mentioned above, IS on the other side accuses al Qaida of splitting the ranks of the 
mujahidin by not submitting to its caliphate (Adnani, 2014a, 2014c). 
 
A Different Definition of the Umma? 
 
As al Qaida’s criticism of IS’s use of takfīr given above shows, there is a difference in 
the two organisations’ ideology (ʿaḳīda) and methodology (manhadj) regarding the issue of 
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takfīr. Whereas IS uses takfīr against a broad range of opponents and excludes people from 
Islam even for minor sins, al Qaida does not make takfīr on the majority of Muslims. 
Taking a look at Zawahiri’s guidelines for jihad, the importance of not harming the 
Muslim umma for al Qaida becomes clear. Zawahiri (2013a) clearly states that every 
aggression against Muslims should be avoided. Furthermore, every attack should be avoided 
when there is only a minimal chance of Muslims getting hurt. Moreover, other members of 
the al Qaida leadership state that it is absolutely forbidden to spill Muslim blood and that 
operations would only be legitimate if one can be certain that there would be no Muslim 
casualties (Libi, 2011). 
By contrast, IS criticises Zawahiri for his guidelines and accuses al Qaida of not 
following the right manhadj anymore. In response to al Qaida’s criticism that IS’s takfīr 
would be too excessive and the organisation would lean towards extremism, IS criticises the 
organisation for not differentiating between individuals who claim to be Muslims. For 
example, IS spokesperson Adnani (2014c) states that al Qaida would not make a difference 
between the mujahidin, members of the ṣaḥwa movement and muggers (mukhāribīn) and 
would include them all in the umma. On the contrary, IS also excludes Sunnis from the umma 
who do not commit a nullifier themselves but fail to condemn others who are sinners in the 
organisation’s view.7 
Whereas al Qaida wants to protect Sunnis under all circumstances, Sunnis who oppose 
IS are regularly declared legitimate targets by IS through using takfīr. “For al-Qa´ida, its use 
of violence to achieve its goals was a tool to be used judiciously against a relatively narrow 
subset of enemies, whereas for the IS, violence has been unleashed broadly against a wide 
range of enemies, including a wide range of Muslims” (Milton, 2014, p. 31). A broad range of 
people are excluded from the umma by IS, whereas al Qaida includes most Sunnis in the 
umma. This points to the fact that the two organisations have different definitions of the 
umma and thus also different populations that they claim to represent. 
                                                 
7 The organisation later retracted the ruling that allowed takfīr of Sunnis who do not condemn sinners (Joscelyn, 
2017). Nevertheless, it did not change its stance on takfīr of the enemy categories mentioned in this paper. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to highlight one of the most important ideological 
differences between two organisations that are often lumped together as extremist salafi jihadi 
groups, namely the use of takfīr as a way to legitimise the targeting of Sunni Muslims. 
Whereas al Qaida and IS agree on the unbelief (kufr) of Arab regimes in the Middle East and 
democratic parties, they differ in their consequences of takfīr. While IS is fighting on multiple 
fronts and declares members of the respective regimes and parties as legitimate targets, al 
Qaida wants to focus on weakening the US first and thus restrains from targeting apostates if 
they do not fight the mujahidin first. Moreover, the organisation criticises IS’s excessive use 
of takfīr against Sunnis who oppose the idea of an Islamic State. IS legitimises targeting 
Sunnis through classifying them as bughāt or munāfiḳīn and consequently excluding them 
from the umma. On the other hand, al Qaida is keen on having a good reputation and does not 
want to alienate the Muslim society. Therefore, it criticises IS for leaning towards extremism 
and exaggeration (ghulū). In the organisation’s view, IS is spilling unlawful Muslim blood. 
This extremism and targeting of Muslims would lead to a separation of the Muslims (fitna). 
Concluding from al Qaida’s criticism of IS’s use of takfīr, one can see a different definition of 
the umma that the two organisations follow. For al Qaida, a broad range of people belong to 
the umma, while for IS only those Sunnis who totally submit to their ideology. 
An understanding of the differing ideologies of the organisations is a necessary 
prerequisite for any deradicalisation program. Additional research is needed on which 
individuals are attracted by which organisation to tailor deradicalisation programs to the needs 
of the target group. 
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